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(When) Does Democratization Reduce State Repression?
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Problem
• Repression comprises acts of violations of physical integrity rights by state-sponsored actors
• Over the last century, state repression has caused six times as many fatalities as all international
wars and civil conflicts taken together
• The literature agrees that democracy is associated with lower repression
• However, the effect of a regime change towards democracy is unclear, because regime changes
can go in hand with civil unrest.
Theory
• We assume that the welfare of individuals is influenced by both economic and political factors
• The objective of the government is to remain in power. To this aim, it can use repression.
• In principle, democracy can affect government repression in two directions:
Motivation Opportunity⤷ Democratic government represents wider 
spectre of societal groups⤷ Better representation of preferences⤷ Less aggregate dissatisfaction⤷ Fewer violent opponents
⤷ Under democracy, opposition has more 
freedom to organize than under autocracy⤷ Violent opponents more effective 
under democracy⤷ Government faces greater threat
à Democratizations reduce repression à Democratizations increase repression
• Using a mathematical model, we predict that income acts as a moderating variable
• Civil unrest is more closely linked to economic factors in democracies than in autocracies
• Hence, higher wealth of the population requires democratic governments to use less repression
Hypothesis: Democratizations are more likely to reduce repression in countries with high income 
levels and more likely to increase repression in low-income countries.
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Conclusions
• We use ”Human Rights Scores” from Fariss (2014) to measure repression
• We restrict our analysis to rapid and stable full democratizations. To define a democratization event,
we use the Polity Scores, an index for democracy. A country experiences a democratization event if:
(1) It reaches the highest or second-highest value on the democracy index
(2) This happens after a substantial improvement in the democracy index within a short time period
(3) It has not been democratic for 10 years before and stays democratic for 5 years after the event
• Common control variables are included: GDP per capita, population, civil war, youth bulges, and trade
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“Traditional” technique: Event study
• Run regressions using observations around
democratization event
• To test our hypothesis: Include interaction term
between event-time-dummies and income
• Rich and poor countries are similar before event
• After event, repression only declines in rich countries
and slightly increases in poor countries
• Our theoretical model predicts that democratizations reduce repression only in countries with
sufficiently high income. This reduction is immediate and persistent.
• Both traditional and modern econometric techniques provide evidence for this hypothesis
• This indicates that promoting democracy may, in some contexts, be detrimental to human rights
“Modern” technique (Xu 2017):
Generalized synthetic control group
• Divide sample in control and treatment group
• Construct “synthetic” (averaged) control group similar to treatment group until the democratization
• The difference between treatment and control group after the event is the effect estimate
• After event, repression relative to the control group declines in rich countries and does not change
in poorer countries
Reversed Human Rights Scores, data from Fariss (2014)
least repressive
most repressive
Repression in 2013
XPolity Scores, data from Marshall and Gurr (2016), adjusted according to Vreeland (2008)
least democratic
most democratic
Democracy in 2013
The maps suggest a moderate relationship between the level of democracy and repression in 2013.
Very similar trend before 
democratization
Results
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